We've been able to show recently that Permutable Chebyshev polynomials (T polynomials) defined over the field of real numbers can be used to create a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange algorithm and certificates. The cryptosystem was theoretically proven to withstand attacks using quantum computers.
Reactions caused by taking big steps
When presenting a new encryption method to the public, acceptance is gradually earned by continuously discussing constructive critique from other scientists and by (ideally) being able to prove security. Our approach [1] , [2] -to use Chebyshev Polynomials over the body of real numbers with the byproduct of inevitably occurring rounding errors -is off the beaten track in cryptography both with respect to mathematics as well as the properties of quantum computers. Readers naturally have the feeling to come across something new. Peer review has so far revealed no security flaw.
Although we've been able to elaborately show in the two previous papers that the proposed key exchange is -according to our opinion -impossible to attack using classical approaches, some readers took it under suspicion that the analytical cosine form of T polynomials may still present an attack path. Security against quantum mechanical attacks have been discussed in detail in our second paper [2] and are unchallenged, but the suspicion includes that there might exist an attack path for quantum computers as well. In order to close the discussion in this direction we present theoretical proofs of security and add practical considerations.
Attacks using Diophantine Equations
The inverse of the cosine representation of Chebyshev Polynomials y=cos ( r⋅ arccos( x)) can be used to yield an equation that allows to evaluate the parameter r with some degree of fuzziness due to the 1 Gilbert Brands, D-26736 Krummhörn, e-mail: gilbert(at)gilbertbrands.de 2 Bernd Röllgen, D-35576 Wetzlar, e-mail: roellgen(at)globaliptel.com 3 Kersten Vogel, CH-8055 Zürich, e-mail: kersten.vogel(at)sap.com periodicity of the cosine function:
The goal is to find an integer number k so that all digits of the fractional part of both real numbers cancel out each other. Abstractly worded, the sieve is on for a solution which satisfies ±d ≡ k⋅ e(mod ℤ ) whereat a≡ b (mod ℤ ) ⇔ a− b ∈ ℤ means that the difference of two real numbers a , b must be in the subring of integer numbers. This appears to have some similarities with modular arithmetic, which is frequently used in cryptography and which requires ideals over a ring. Integer numbers are although everything but an ideal of real numbers. They are only a subring of real numbers, and therefore modular arithmetic cannot be applied directly.
The method of resolution in [3] consists of the multiplication of a real number by a sufficiently large integer number M=10 m (the representation as decimal power is not mandatory but eases analysis so that it is possible to stick to the assumption without loss of generality), taking the integral part for the further calculations. By doing so, the equation is transformed into a diophantine equation:
The brackets [..] represent the floor function (mapping of a real number to the smallest adjacent integer), or in an equivalent form not using a modulus
In order to be solvable,
must be fulfilled. In order to arrive here, a multitude of proven algorithms exist since the ancient world: the (extended) Euclidean algorithm, the continued fraction method, the Euler method and Euler's theorem with the aid of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Having the special solutions {k ' , n' } depending on the solution method used, all other solutions are of the form
with arbitrary z∈ ℤ , and the expectation is to find the exact secret r among the n ( z) series.
We already showed in [1] that a solution of a diophantine equation of this kind is in general not a solution for r , but used a more practical oriented argumentation. 4 We now prove this proposition mathematically. Beyond the rationale the authors in [3] further created the impression that there exist exact diophantine equations. We start by showing: Lemma 1. Except for trivial cases exact diophantine equations do not exist. Setting arccos(T r ( x))=π⋅ t z /t n , arccos( x)=π⋅ x z / x n and substituting in the original equation we yield
In order to yield a solution, it is necessary that t n ≤ gcd (2⋅ t n ⋅ x n ,t n ⋅ x z ) | t z ⋅ x n , or in other words the denominator of arccos( x) must be a multiple of the denominator of arccos (T r (x)) .
Although trigonometric functions do not preserve relations of arguments, we can look for hints for such a relation stemming from T polynomials. Starting from x =a 1 /b the T polynomial calculation arrives at y=a 2 /(b⋅ c) , which is quite the opposite relation in the arguments of the arccos function than necessary for the diophantine equation. To be fulfilled, trigonometric functions have to invert a relation in the arguments which is quite not the case. The requirements of diophantine equations cannot be met for T-polynomials, except in trivial cases.
4 "In general" does mean that we do not claim that there is no solution at all under special conditions. We are confident that there is none, but our proof doesn't show this explicitely. So we restrain our statement to "in general".
So in general the diophantine equation has no solution for k, n , but k, n exist -proved by the theory of T polynomials. The conclusion is that the mapping arccos :ℚ → π ℚ does not exist -except for some trivial cases, which closes the proof. 
which results in
The square root is an integer number if and only if a,b are part of a basic pythagorean triple. Hence it is possible to construct a non rational example from each hypothetical rational example except for very special cases. This contradicts the hypothetical example itself resulting in the conclusion: a π-rational mapping does not exist except for trivial cases.
Q.E.D.
A diophantine equation can only be approximative. If d , e∈ ℚ , an approximative diophantine equation can be formed by adding or subtracting 1 from one of the constants of the left side of the equation. To answer the question whether an approximative equation may lead to usable results we set up Lemma 2. Approximative diophantine equations have no solutions giving a statistically significant advantage over brute force attacks.
Proof:
are candidates for the integer numbers in the diophantine equation. 
This simple conclusion is very important concerning the QC safety of the algorithm: the inverse of the cosine function may be thought to provide access to periodic states which are a prerequisite for an attack using Shor's algorithm. But there are no periodic states, so this is also a mathematical proof that the RVB algorithm cannot be attacked by Shor's algorithm on the base of the inverse of the cosine function.
Experimental Verification
Mathematicians usually close the file at this point, but computer scientists generally find the practical verification helpful. Although we showed mathematically that there is no solution to the attack problem, the computer scientist may also still believe in coming close enough to the secret to shrink the search space to an amount suitable to mount a systematic attack. We consequently provide a visualization with a secret in the range 10 12 ≤ r≤ 10 13 and a floating point precision of 150 decimal digits, which is a much higher accuracy than in a realistic key negotiation. To reveil the secret parameter r, we have to scan n(z), which is quite a simple task Scan: 241543994 <= z <= 241544137 (the difference between upper and lower boundary is 143) range(n): 97362832144 < 342683123012 < 999280065647
However the scan yields as best approximations for the secret parameter Since an attacker Eve doesn't know the exakt secret parameter unlike we do in this simulation, Eve may adopt a strategy to scan the n(z) range which has a width of only 143 integer numbers, and then test the neighborhood of each candidate to detect the secret. The neighborhood however is 7*10 8 in width resulting in a scan range of 10
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, which is only slightly better than a full scan -the equivalent to a Brute Force Attack.
In this strategy Eve has to check wether a candidate for n produces the correct tr. Alternatively Eve can scan k(z) in the floating point equation to produce an integer number n∈ ℤ . Both strategies demand floating point calculations and therefore consume lots of time.
Remark 1. One of our correspondents demands to use continued fraction development of the floating point parameters to very high accuracies instead of using a simple decimal power M. We leave it to the reader to verify that this is nothing but a shot in the dark because there as well exists an infinite number of equations and the continued fraction methods end in an unsolvable diophantine equation like in lemma 1 and have to be "corrected" to be able to proceed. Remark 2. Testing many candidates r' for the secret derived from these trials may result in differences d =tr− cos (r '⋅ acos( x)) which are very small. It can even happen that r' is several decimal powers distant from the real secret r . The reader is adviced not to interpret this fact as having broken the algorithm. As we already discussed in [1] , a point of a given graph may be approximated very closely by another graph, but the approximation only holds for a few points. It can easily be verified that the common secret T rs ( x) isn't hit at all by Eve's faulty secret.
Another attack path may intentionally ignore theorem 2 for practical reasons and look for a k solving These results show that this attack path is not suitable to attack the proposed public key exchange.
Classical Attack Strategy
In practice, numbers like the following occur in the encryption algorithm:
This leads for r ranging in the order of magnitude of 10 100 that from the 300 decimal digits of the function value y already the trailing approx. 100 are pure phantasy due to inevitable rounding errors. The orders of magnitude are very well known by attackers due to the fact that they know the method. When mounting an attack, the order of magnitude can thus be accounted for.
Use of diophantine equations is not an option. The targeted parameter k is in the same order of magnitude as r . It needs to be computed in a way so that t=[log 10 (k)] decimal digits are cancelled.
± d + k* e = Z.0000...00000zzzzzz...
--t digits ---
If a smaller number of digits is cancelled, no solution is found. If additional digits are cancelled, the solution doesn't get better. Since at the multiplication operation k⋅ e as well the digits [log 10 (r )]+1.. [2⋅ log 10 (r )] have an influence on the range that is to be adjusted to zero, the task can be solved by entraining approx. 200 digits of (d , e) . These digits are, by reason of the overall process, exact.
The attacker can try to identify a solution 1. directly in the floating point representation with [2⋅ log 10 (r)] decimal digits or 2. by using modular arithmetic on
and [log( S )]=[log(r )] which is about 10 times faster than the first method because integer arithmetics can be implemented more efficiently (see section 3).
For both variants there are no algorithms known that yield a solution in a practical amount of time. Regarding 2. it is pointed to the fact that the security of cryptographic algorithms using modular arithmetic relies on the non-solvability of such relations. In a loop to compute r using floating point numbers, the values for k
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are to be investigated, whereas in each step it is tested if ±d + k⋅ e in the most significant 9 digits after the decimal point exhibits the pattern .000000000 or .999999999 . The integer method is faster by approx. 10 times compared to the floating point method. Time complexity increases by O (r) , which means that it increases tenfold with each additional decimal digit in r .
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No useful attack method can be derived from this.
Attacks using Quantum Computers
The classical attack strategy (4.), which is executed as brute force attack, can potentially be conducted using quantum computers. By way of derogation from the previously discussed algorithms, this algorithm can be executed using simple modular multiplication with little consumption of resources (< 1.000 qubits without error correction) using Grover's algorithm. Grover's algorithm is discussed in detail in [4] . The operations correspond with those of the integer number sieve -with only the upper half of all decimal digits (respectively their corresponding qubits) being evaluated in the final step of the QC algorithm. So this attack path seems to be in the range of quantum computers suitable to attack RSA provided that quantum computers with the necessary complexity can be realized -which has not been proven so far.
It has to mentioned however that which renders the proposed key exchange algorithm quite QC safe both theoretically as well as practically.
The only QC algorithm capable of breaking encryption systems from a theoretical point of view is likely to be Shor's algorithm implemented on modular integer arithmetics, and searching for periodic states. But the theorem proves that there are no periodic states, so this algorithm cannot be used.
With this analysis, all currently known attack stategies for data encryption using T-polynomials on real numbers have been covered. Currently there neither exists any classical nor any quantum computer-assisted attack.
